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Abstract The actions performed by individuals, as consumers and citizens, have
aggregate negative consequences for the environment. The question asked in this paper is
to what extent it is reasonable to hold individuals and institutions responsible for envi-
ronmental problems. A distinction is made between backward-looking and forward-
looking responsibility. Previously, individuals were not seen as being responsible for
environmental problems, but an idea that is now sometimes implicitly or explicitly
embraced in the public debate on environmental problems is that individuals are appro-
priate targets for blame when they perform actions that are harmful to the environment.
This idea is criticized in this paper. It is argued that instead of blaming individuals for
performing actions that are not environmentally friendly we should ascribe forward-
looking responsibility to individuals, a notion that focuses more on capacity and resources
than causation and blameworthiness. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that a great
share of forward-looking responsibility should also be ascribed to institutional agents,
primarily governments and corporations. The urge to ascribe forward-looking responsi-
bility to institutional agents is motivated by the efficiency aim of responsibility
distributions. Simply put, if responsibility is ascribed to governments and corporations
there is a better chance of creating a society in which the opportunities to act in an
environmentally friendly way increase.
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Introduction
Ever since the damage done to the environment came to the fore as one of the modern
world’s most urgent problems, discussions concerning who causes it and whose task it is to
solve it have been frequent.1 Both are questions about responsibility, backward-looking
and forward-looking responsibility. This kind of discussion has become even more pre-
valent during the last years when the alarms of climate change have become more
recurrent. To what extent are environmental problems the responsibility of individuals, as
consumers and citizens? With the knowledge we have today about the causes of envi-
ronmental problems2 and the fact that citizens in many industrialized societies are well-
informed about their own role in contributing to the problems, individuals appear to have
some responsibility. People choose to behave in ways that contribute to the problems or to
their solutions. Hence, as individuals we are taken to be morally responsible for envi-
ronmental problems. It has been pointed out that the notion of the consumer as an active
and responsible agent is embraced by strong actors within governments, the corporate
sector, and NGOs.3 Furthermore, it is believed that we can make a difference when making
choices about what to buy, and the individual consumer is often seen as not only
responsible for herself, but directly responsible for the world.4 As Michele Micheletti
asserts, ‘‘everyday choices and acts by individuals play an important role for the future of
political, social, and economic life. In short, every person is part of global responsibility-
taking.5 Eivind Jacobsen and Arne Dulsrud, criticize this idea of a ‘‘generic active con-
sumer’’ and claim that this is far from a universal entity.6 They argue that consumers
appear to be strongly influenced by cultural, social, and institutional settings and thus have
very different attitudes and beliefs depending on where they live. This means that the
voluntariness with which individuals, as consumers and citizens, act is not as substantial as
is sometimes assumed.
These insights should be used in our discussion of individual moral responsibility for
environmental problems like climate change. A common assumption is that we are
responsible to the extent we causally contributed to a problem. This notion has previously
led to the view that because my actions are so marginal, I am not at all responsible for the
aggregate environmental problem, e.g., air pollution, the problem of waste, or climate
change. This, I believe, is not correct. However, replacing the idea that individuals are
exempted from responsibility for environmental problems with a notion of full individual
responsibility is too hasty. I will argue that the extent to which individuals should be held
responsible for environmental problems needs to be placed in context. More specifically, I
will argue that an individual should not necessarily be held responsible in the backward-
looking sense. This means that she should not be blamed for, e.g., performing the less
1 In the following, I will use ‘‘moral responsibility’’ and ‘‘responsibility’’ interchangeably.
2 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, there are both natural-scientific and institutional causes of
environmental problems. Using climate change as an example, the agreement on the natural-scientific causes
is substantial. Since the latest IPCC Report (Fourth Assessment Report Climate Change 2007 Synthesis
Report http://www.ipcc.ch.), there is even agreement that human beings cause climate change through
extensive carbon dioxide emissions. There is more disagreement concerning institutional features that
contributes to the problem or its solution.
3 Jacobsen and Dulsrud (2007, p. 475).
4 Sassatelli (2006, pp. 233–234).
5 Micheletti (2003, p. 2).
6 Jacobsen and Dulsrud (2007).
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environmentally friendly action instead of the more environmentally friendly action, when
she lacked reasonable alternatives or the cost of choosing the right action was too high. The
individual’s choice to act in a certain way should be considered in her socio-economic,
political, and cultural context. The idea that agents should be excused in circumstances
when their actions were not fully voluntary has been asserted by philosophers since
Aristotle.7 However, this reasonable idea appears not to be taken fully into account in the
current public debate on individual responsibility for environmental problems. Although it
is a good development that we are now starting to publicly debate environmental problems
to a previously unseen extent and to acknowledge the role of human beings, we now seem
to run the risk of putting too much focus on the behavior of individuals at the expense of
illuminating the vital role of institutions.
Although sometimes excused from backward-looking responsibility, I will argue that
some individuals should be ascribed forward-looking responsibility. Individuals who have
reasonable alternatives, capacity, and resources to do something about the environment
should be seen as responsible. Institutional agents have the power and resources to affect
the number of individuals who possess such capacity and resources. Because of this, a
great share of responsibility should be assigned to governments and corporations. I will
argue that such institutional agents are responsible (in a forward-looking sense) because a)
they have power and resources to do more to solve environmental problems, and b) they
have the capacity to make it easier and less costly for individuals to act in environmentally
friendly ways.
Before moving on, let us make two conceptual clarifications. First, when I discuss
individual responsibility in the following, I primarily refer to individuals as individual
consumers and/or citizens. I will not discuss individuals acting in groups, nor will I discuss
group agency. Those are interesting questions, but they will not be the focus of this
particular paper. Second, when I discuss institutions or institutional agents I primarily refer
to governments and corporations.
The paper is structured as follows. First, some examples are given to show what I have
in mind when discussing individuals being responsible for acts that contribute to envi-
ronmental problems. Second, the concept of moral responsibility is discussed to clarify the
thesis of the paper. Third, the notion that individuals are blameworthy for performing acts
that contribute to environmental problems is criticized. Fourth, the suggestion that indi-
viduals are responsible in a forward-looking sense is presented. Fifth, the forward-looking
responsibility of institutional agents is discussed.
Examples—The Intuitive Level
Before discussing the issue of responsibility from a philosophical perspective, let us look at
a few examples that inspired this paper.
Imagine that in Agnes’s residential area, which is socio-economically underprivileged,
there is no recycling station and Agnes, who cannot afford to drive a car, would have to
travel by public transport to get to the nearest recycling station. Agnes is a single mother
and it is practically very challenging for her to take her waste to the recycling station. Her
options are as follows.
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics The Internet Classicas Archive,
translated by W.D. Ross http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html.
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1) Going to the recycling station and putting the cans in the appropriate container. In this
case, she has three options:
a. Bringing her three children, paying for bus tickets, and going to the recycling
station.
b. Hiring a babysitter, paying for a bus ticke,t and taking the bus to the recycling
station.
c. Borrowing someone’s car to go to the recycling station.
2) Throwing the cans in the household trash.
If she lived in a place where the recycling station was merely a short walk away or if she
had someone who could help her by taking her waste to the recycling station for her or look
after her children while she went there, that would have made a difference in terms of her
options. ‘‘Intuitively, it does not appear reasonable to hold Agnes fully responsible for
choosing the second option, i.e., to throw the cans in the household trash.’’
A second example relates to the suggestion that consumers should choose ‘‘climate
smart’’ food over food that has been transported long distances by airplane or truck or the
production of which was very energy-intense. Imagine Bernard, a consumer who refrains
from buying ‘‘climate smart’’ food. If Bernard is economically under-privileged and lives
in a society where organically and locally produced vegetables are more expensive than
non-organic tomatoes from far away, then buying ‘‘climate smart’’ products would require
much more of him than an individual under more fortunate circumstances. If compared to
another individual, Charles, who lives in the same society, but who is well-off, there is
obviously a crucial difference between Bernard and Charles in terms of the cost of
choosing the environmentally friendly action.
A third example is the notion that we should all contribute to the reduction of carbon
dioxide emissions through using public transport instead of driving our own cars. The
environmentally friendly thing to do is most probably to take public transport instead of
driving a car to work and in some places there are reliable, safe, and well functioning
public transport systems. However, other societies lack a reliable, safe, and adequately
extensive public transport system and this, my intuition tells me, makes a relevant dif-
ference for what can justifiably be required.
Imagine an individual, Donna, who lives in a society where public transport is well-
developed and another individual Emma, who does not. The crucial difference between
Donna and Emma is the alternatives open to them. It is not asking too much to expect Donna
to use public transport, thereby contributing to a better environment or at least not polluting
it. However, expecting Emma to do the same is to ask a lot more, since the alternative is either
not there or is there but the cost of choosing it (in terms of money, time, and/or convenience)
is simply too high. Whereas we still believe she should do what she can to use public
transport instead of driving a car, we should not put the same kind of demands on her as we do
on Donna. The alternatives presented to Emma may be the following.
1) Driving for one hour.
2) Walking five minutes to the subway station and taking the subway to work, which is a
one hour journey.
Compare this to Emma’s options below.
1) Driving for one hour.
2) Walking 1000 meters to the bus stop, waiting for the bus that is normally not on time
and travelling for two hours on the bus.
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We have now looked at some cases in which the environmentally damaging act of an
individual is put in the context of the alternatives she had when acting. In the first case the
problem is the practical challenges or the effort that has to be made in order to do the
environmentally friendly thing. In the second example, the obstacle is money. In the third
example it is the infrastructure that is different in Donna’s and Emma’s cases. The
infrastructure is arguably the result of political decisions, culture, and tradition as well as
economic factors.
The examples are common in everyday life and I think many of us, if confronted with
such examples, would agree that people have different sets of alternatives when acting due
to their different contexts and the choice to act in environmentally damaging ways can be
more or less voluntary. I argue that this should be taken into account when discussing
individual responsibility for environmental problems. I believe many of us share this
intuition and many philosophers have theorized about the importance of alternatives for
acting and the importance of voluntariness to moral responsibility. Yet this notion is
frequently ignored in the public debate on individual responsibility for the environment
where all individuals appears to be considered as equally appropriate subjects of respon-
sibility, as if either all individuals are responsible for the environment or no individuals
are responsible for the environment.
Moral Responsibility
Before continuing the discussion, we should make some clarifications regarding the con-
cept and notions of moral responsibility.
The concept of moral responsibility is evasive and is used differently in different
contexts. It is sometimes equated with blameworthiness, but whereas blameworthiness was
discussed by Aristotle, the term responsibility is fairly new.8
A first distinction to be made is the following. First, responsibility can be used in a
backward-looking (retrospective) sense and a forward-looking (prospective, remedial)
sense, i.e., essentially referring to blameworthiness for past actions or to future action
taking. The notion that responsibility is sometimes more forward-looking than backward-
looking is common in non-philosophical discussions, but it is to, some extent, a neglected
topic in philosophical discussions.9
Traditionally, the primary notion discussed is backward-looking responsibility, or rather
backward-looking responsibility as blameworthiness or culpability. The notion of
responsibility I question in the following is backward-looking, referring to actions per-
formed by an individual in the past that are believed to have caused negative outcomes and
where the agent is considered blameworthy. This idea will be contrasted with a more
forward-looking notion of responsibility.
So, what is it to be responsible in the backward-looking sense? According to Peter
Strawson’s influential theory of responsibility, moral responsibility consists of the reactive
attitudes, for example resentment and gratitude, we hold towards each other as co-members
of the moral community.10
8 McKeon (1957).
9 Some exceptions: Richardson (1999, pp. 218–249); Young (2006), Goodin (1986); Miller (2005); Green
(2005), and Nihle´n Fahlquist (2006).
10 Strawson (1962).
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In our present context this could mean, for example, that when someone who is
environmentally aware sees Agnes throwing aluminium cans in the trash bin she is likely to
react with some resentment and hold Agnes responsible by blaming her for performing the
action that contributes to the problem of waste instead of the action that is more envi-
ronmentally friendly, i.e., to recycle the cans.11
However, the reactive attitudes appear not to tell the whole story of what moral
responsibility is. For, as members of the moral community, we also have the ability to step
back and analyze situations from a more detached perspective and most of us are also able
to assess and alter our conduct, for example when confronted with new information. When
the person blaming Agnes learns more about Agnes’s situation, she may analyze the
situation differently and change her view on Agnes’s responsibility.
It has been argued that Strawson’s view makes it difficult to criticize practices of
holding agents responsible and that it is, to some extent, static and relativistic. There is a
difference between being held responsible and being responsible that is not captured by the
theory of responsibility as reactive attitudes.12 To be morally responsible is not merely to
be a target of reactive attitudes. According to John M. Fischer’s revised Strawsonian
theory, ‘‘agents are morally responsible if and only if they are appropriate recipients of
reactive attitudes.’’13 Hence, whereas one element of moral responsibility is the reactive
attitudes towards the actions of co-agents in a moral community, another element is critical
reflection of these practices.
Thus, the notion being criticized in this paper is the following.
Individuals, as consumers and/or citizens are appropriate recipients of reactive
attitudes, e.g., blame, when acting in ways that, in the aggregate, contribute to
environmental problems.
Individuals and Blameworthiness
Previously, environmental problems were not thought to create demands for individuals,
but instead these problems were merely discussed on an international level by governments
as a matter of legislation and policy and for a long time the environment had a low priority.
This approach, I think, was too extreme in its refusal to acknowledge individual respon-
sibility. It was too extreme for two reasons. First, if we are to solve environmental
problems, which we should, it will in the end be a matter of people acting in ways that
promote such solutions. The question is how to get there, not whether we should get there.
Second, a society in which people care about the environment, perhaps by developing
green virtues,14 is likely to be a better society. I will not go into the arguments here, just
state that those who claim that individual behavior is important as well as those arguing
that a society where people care about the environment is better than a society where
people do not care about the environment appear to have reliable arguments. I will not dig
deeper into that here because I would like to focus on the current tendency in the public
debate on environmental problems, primarily climate change because of its urgency, to
ascribe responsibility to individuals as consumers and citizens for those problems. To make
11 I assume here that this is the more environmentally friendly act, being aware that there may be different
opinions on that.
12 Fischer and Ravizza (1993).
13 Ibid.
14 Jamieson (2007).
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this clearer, I do not disagree with those who claim that it is ultimately a matter of
individuals behaving in ways that promote a better environment. I wish to question the
jump from that observation to the conclusion that individuals are blameworthy for acts that
contribute in the aggregate to environmental problems.
During the last few years, when climate change has come to the fore as the major global
challenge and is beginning to be discussed as a moral issue, individuals are increasingly
seen as the responsible agents and appropriate targets of blame when refraining from acting
in climate-smart ways, e.g., recycling, turning the thermostat down, driving a car instead of
using public transport or cycling and so forth. Accordingly, demands that individuals’
choices regarding, for example, consumption and transportation should be morally scru-
tinized are being expressed in public debates. There are, for instance, tests on various
websites where one can answer a set of questions to see how ‘‘climate-smart’’ one lives,
whether one is ‘‘environmentally aware’’ and so forth. Consumers who buy organic (and
fair trade etc.) food are called and sometimes identify themselves as ‘‘ethical consumers.’’
The implicit implication of this new notion of full individual responsibility for the envi-
ronment appears to be that if one does not always choose the most environmentally
friendly option, one is, to some extent, an ‘‘unethical’’ or at least a ‘‘non-ethical’’ or
irresponsible consumer, hence an appropriate target for blame.
The primary problem with the question whether individuals should be held responsible
when acting in ways that contribute to environmental problems is that it is often assumed to
be a question between the following statements:
1. Individuals should be held responsible when acting in ways that contribute to
environmental problems.
2. Individuals should not be held responsible when acting in ways that contribute to
environmental problems.
What is not being acknowledged when stating the question as a choice between 1 and 2 is
that individuals are different and exist in different socio-economic, political, and cultural
contexts. Consequently, the answer cannot be that all individuals are always responsible or
no individuals are ever responsible. Individuals are responsible, i.e., appropriate targets of
blame, for some of their environmentally-unfriendly actions and not for others. The notion
that individuals perform such acts with different degrees of voluntariness should inform
our ascriptions of responsibility. This is an old idea that is not adequately taken into
account in the current public debate on environmental problems.
The notion that the degree of voluntariness with which an agent performed an act affects
the blameworthiness of that agent has been present in philosophical discussions since
Antiquity. According to Aristotle, agents are only blameworthy for voluntary acts. Vol-
untary acts are acts not performed under i) compulsion or ii) due to ignorance.15 Whereas
individual responsibility (in the backward-looking sense) was for a long time not discussed
in debate on environmental problems, we have seen a change during recent years and we
are now, as consumers, expected to behave in certain ways, for instance to buy organic
food, to use public transport, to ride a bike, and to reduce the thermostat in our houses and
so forth. This is problematic partly because when we make claims about what individuals
ought to do and what their responsibility is, individuals are taken to be very similar, as if
their social, economical, cultural, and political contexts were identical. Eivind Jacobsen
and Arne Dulsrud, rightly criticize this idea of a ‘‘generic active consumer’’ and argue that
15 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book III.
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this individual is far from a universal entity.16 Instead consumers appear to be strongly
influenced by cultural, social, and institutional settings and thus have very different atti-
tudes and beliefs depending on where they live. However, focusing too much on individual
responsibility is not problematic just because individual differences are not acknowledged
to an adequate extent. It is also problematic because there are often structural and societal
features, that work as obstacles to most citizens in a society.
What I am arguing here is the following. Individuals are blameworthy for acts that
contribute to environmental problems, e.g., refraining from recycling, driving instead of
using public transport or a bicycle, when it was reasonable to expect them to choose the
environmentally friendly option. This means that when there was a reasonable alternative
to act in a more environmentally friendly way or when the cost and effort of performing the
environmentally friendly act was reasonable an individual is to blame for not choosing that
course of action. This is so because when they had that alternative, for example, when there
is a highly developed and accessible recycling system, public transport system, or bicycle
lanes, it is reasonable to demand that they do choose the environmentally friendly option.
Likewise, if the individual is well-off it is reasonable to expect her to buy climate-smart
food even if it is expensive. If such opportunities to do right, to act environmentally
friendly, exist to an adequate extent there are no excuses and individuals should be
expected to do so. However, if an agent is poor and climate-smart food is expensive—it is
not fair to hold her responsible for buying the least expensive and less environmentally
friendly alternative.
Reasonable Alternatives
What, then, can be said about the reasonableness of alternatives? When does an individual
consumer or citizen have reasonable alternatives? As mentioned above, Aristotle argued
that an individual should be excused from (backward-looking, in my terms) responsibility
(blame) when she did not act voluntarily, i.e., acted under compulsion or due to ignorance.
The lack of reasonable alternatives can be stated in similar terms. Although consumers are
not coerced into buying food that was produced using unnecessarily high levels of energy,
if organic or climate-smart food is very expensive compared to regular food, the alternative
to buy the environmentally less damaging food is not really an option unless the consumer
is wealthy. This is an example of how the cost of choosing the ‘‘right’’ option is highly
relevant. In addition to cost, the availability of good options is relevant. If 99% of the
products in grocery stores are not climate-smart products, this is obviously an obstacle to
people who want to reduce their carbon footprint even if they can afford to buy those
products. Similarly, unless there are safe and extensive bicycle lanes, the alternative to ride
a bike instead of driving a car is not a realistic option for people who drive to work. The
latter is an example of how culture, tradition, and political decisions affect how people
choose to act. They may choose to drive their car because they grew up and live in a
society that treats cars and highways as very important parts of life and society. On the
other hand, they may resist that cultural pressure and want to ride a bicycle or use public
transport instead, but if the infrastructure makes it difficult or too inconvenient to choose
those options, the conscientious citizen may, very reluctantly, continue to drive their car to
work. In real life, compulsion appears to be a matter of degree and although nobody is
forcing people, it may be very difficult to choose the environmentally friendly option.
16 Jacobsen and Dulsrud (2007).
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It is obviously difficult to draw a line between what is reasonable and what is not in
individual cases. On the political and general level, it is clear that some infrastructural,
cultural, socio-economic, and political features of modern societies are questionable from
an environmental perspective and that these features affect what alternatives individuals
have to act in ways that promote solutions to environmental problems. The most obvious
problem is likely to be the car-dependency of industrialized nations. A second problem
may be the extent to which people in Western societies are used to eating meat products. A
third problem is the overuse of packaging and plastic bags.
In addition to cost and the availability of good options, information about the envi-
ronmental footprints we leave is obviously crucial. However, the question of what
information there is, is not as straightforward as one might think. In most well-ordered
societies there is information available, which means that most people have the opportunity
to know how their behavior affects the environment. Even if there is a lot of information, it
is sometimes too expensive to do the environmentally right thing. In many cases, the
information does not reach all groups of people in society.
Furthermore, all these factors, cost, substantial inconvenience, availability, and infor-
mation problems, affect the reasonableness of the alternatives individual consumers and
citizens have when they ‘‘choose’’ to act in environmentally friendly or environmentally
unfriendly ways. Because these are highly prevalent problems in most societies today, it is
not fair or fruitful to ascribe backward-looking responsibility neither to individuals taken
separately nor to the group of individual consumers or citizens in these societies.
Individual Forward-Looking Responsibility
To abandon talk about individual responsibility in the backward-looking sense does not
necessarily entail an abandonment of all notions of individual responsibility for the
environment. There is an additional notion of responsibility that should be used instead. It
is common in non-philosophical debates, but less explored in philosophical literature, i.e.,
forward-looking responsibility.17 My claim is that although individuals should not be held
responsible in the backward-looking sense when they did not have reasonable alternatives
to act in environmentally friendly ways, it is sometimes reasonable to ascribe forward-
looking responsibility to individuals.
So, what is forward-looking responsibility? James Garvey, discussing the claim that rich
countries ought to do more than poor countries to combat climate change, suggests that just
as ‘‘ought implies can’’ is usually seen as a core principle in ethics, ‘‘can implies ought’’ in
some circumstances.18 He does not elaborate this idea, but I believe there is something
highly reasonable in his brief statement. One of the arguments for the principle Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities (CDR) is based on a similar notion. CDR is the prin-
ciple stating that rich countries should bear a greater proportion of responsibility for
climate change. There are two very different justifications for CDR. First, rich countries are
said to have a greater responsibility to solve the problems of climate change because they,
historically, contributed more to the emissions of carbon dioxide. Second, rich countries
have a greater capacity primarily in terms of power and resources to solve these problems.
Whereas the former justification is in line with the backward-looking notion of responsi-
bility, the latter is more in line with a forward-looking notion of responsibility. This is a
17 Richardson (1999).
18 Garvey (2008).
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reasonable idea and, I would like to argue, should be applied to individuals as well as to
nations. If an individual is in a good position to do something to contribute to the solution
of environmental problems she has a responsibility to do so. If an individual is less capable
to do so, she should be partly excused. There is no standard individual who has a standard
share of responsibility, namely full or no responsibility. There are only particular indi-
viduals in particular socio-economical, cultural, and political contexts.
The idea that if you have more resources or a greater ability to contribute to a solving a
problem is endorsed by many people, although not necessarily explicitly. Consider, for
instance, the financial donations to charity made by extremely affluent people like Bill
Gates. Of course it could be argued that he does not have to contribute to social causes, but
it is admirable that he does so, that he is an altruistic person. Alternatively, it could be
argued that he only contributes for PR reasons, i.e., that he wants to market himself as a
good or moral person because that is good for business. However, I think many people
would describe this as a wealthy, resourceful, and powerful man taking his (forward-
looking) responsibility, a responsibility it is reasonable that he takes because of his
capacity to contribute to social causes. At a minimum, to think about it this way does not
appear to be tremendously controversial.
The same applies to the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), i.e., the dis-
cussion concerning whether private companies have a responsibility (extending their legal
responsibility) to contribute to social causes or not. If so, should they do it because it is
good for business or should they do it regardless of the effect on business or does the
reason for doing it matter at all if the consequences are good? Regardless of this debate in
business ethics, many people today appear to think that multi-national companies or large
companies have a responsibility to contribute to societal causes. A third example relates to
the notion that rich countries have a responsibility to help poor countries in various ways,
with money, education, and technology transfer. In developed, democratic, and well-
ordered nations it is a shared notion that the government should give aid to less developed
countries. There is often disagreement on the size of aid and the exact content (money or
self-help aid), but that there ought to be some kind of aid to less fortunate peoples is now a
well-entrenched notion in developed nations.
These discussions are likely to go on and my intention of bringing them to the current
discussion is not to go deeper into the arguments for and against the various views.
However, these debates show that there is a common intuition in contemporary societies
that if an agent, whether individual or institutional, has the capacity, power, and resources
to contribute to solving a social problem, they have a responsibility to do so, i.e., that
power and capacity entails responsibility. This kind of responsibility is forward-looking
and fairly open-ended and it does not have to be stated exactly when such a responsibility
has been fulfilled.19 Consequently, it leaves open exactly what the agent ought to do and
involves a certain degree of flexibility and permission to improvise.
This is the way in which individuals as consumers and citizens are responsible for
environmental problems. Individuals should do what they can against the background of
their particular situation. The more resources, power, and capacity an agent has the better
her ability to contribute to solving the problem and the more reasonable it is to ascribe
forward-looking responsibility to her. This view means that the causal links are less central
than it is in the backward-looking concept. Just as Bill Gates did not cause the social
problems he contributes to solving by giving money to charity, the individuals that are best
placed to contribute to solving environmental problems are possibly not the ones who
19 Goodin (1986); Richardson (1999, pp. 218–249).
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contributed the most causally to these problems. Their position to do more can be due to
several factors, most likely involving financial resources but also education, information,
and leadership skills in terms of a talent for influencing others.
Institutional Responsibility
We now have the conceptual and normative tools to say in virtue of what institutional
agents like governments and corporations are responsible for environmental problems and
how their responsibility is related to individual responsibility. Governments and corpo-
rations are responsible because it is in their power to create reasonable alternatives for
individuals. They have it in their power to make it easier and less expensive for individuals
to choose the environmentally friendly option and they can provide information that is
easily accessible and as straight-forward as possible. In essence, they are responsible
because they have the power to create opportunities for individuals to do what is right.
Another way of phrasing it is to say that institutions can make it easier for individuals to
assume forward-looking responsibility. This could be done by making information
accessible, subsidizing organic food while taxing non-organic food, by product develop-
ment and presentation of products and so forth.20 The greater the extent to which these
actors have done that, the greater the extent of individual responsibility. The greater the
extent to which institutional agents have taken their forward-looking responsibility, the
greater the extent to which it is reasonable to ascribe both backward-looking and forward-
looking responsibility to individuals when they do not choose the environmentally friendly
option. First, the greater the availability and affordability of good options, the more rea-
sonable it is to blame those individuals who still do not adjust their behavior. Second, the
greater the extent to which, e.g., governments have assumed their responsibility, the larger
the group of individuals with enough capacity and resources to assume their forward-
looking responsibility.
For example, if the government has invested in an extensive public transport system, the
degree of individual responsibility for choosing to drive a car instead of using public
transport is higher than it would have been if the public transport system had been
underdeveloped and unreliable. If a corporation can provide environmentally friendly
products at a reasonable cost it is their responsibility to do so. For example, restaurants
should be able to provide customers with food that has been produced in environmentally
friendly ways and not transported across the globe.
Some critics will argue that individuals have a personal responsibility, which would
be eroded if we allocate too much responsibility to institutional actors. Do individuals
not have to do anything by themselves? I think there are two ways to respond to such
criticism.
First, one way of conceptualizing a forward-looking responsibility is through a virtue
ethical approach. Garrath Williams views responsibility as a virtue, which essentially
represents a ‘‘readiness to respond to a plurality of normative demands.’’21 This is a
slightly different way to conceptualizing the idea that individuals are too complex to assess
morally merely on the basis of isolated actions. Instead focus should be on an individual’s
whole life and character as well as the way in which the character evolves and improves.
20 Of course it is not always easy to determine whether organic food is the best option from a climate
change perspective.
21 Williams (2008).
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It focuses on the different roles an individual has and challenges to respond to a plurality
of, sometimes even conflicting, demands. Viewed from that angle, personal responsibility
is still very important.
However, what should be acknowledged is that individuals’ character and the virtue of
behaving responsibly can be affected by social systems, policies, and information and
education. Against this background, this institutional responsibility can be stated as
follows.
Responsibility of governments and corporations: To create systems to make it easier for
individuals to respond to the emerging norm that we ought to act in environmentally
friendly ways.
A second way of responding to the critique that personal responsibility is eroded if too
much responsibility is ascribed to institutions is the following. Ascribing and distributing
responsibility is a social practice that serves two purposes. First, it creates or establishes
fairness. Second it is a tool to establish an effective and efficient division of labor in order
to solve societal problems.22 The optimal distribution of responsibility is both fair and
effective, although it is sometimes difficult to achieve both to the same extent. Sometimes,
one of the two purposes is more important than the other and the two have to be weighed
against each other in each case. There are areas of life and society where stating that
something is the personal responsibility of individuals is fair and when this is the most
important feature of that distribution of responsibility. There are other areas, for example,
climate change, the problems of which are too urgent and to vast to only care about fairness
and personal responsibility.
The long-term goal should be to encourage virtuous individuals, as citizens and con-
sumers, i.e., for example to have people embrace green virtues.23 It would, of course, be nice
if people in general start to care about the environment more naturally and every day.
However, from the short-term perspective we need to add that this distribution of respon-
sibility should also be effective and efficient, i.e., contributing to a solution to the problem.
That is why the greatest share of responsibility for environmental problems should be
ascribed to the most powerful, resourceful, and capable actors, i.e., governments and cor-
porations, because they can create systems that make it easier and less costly for people to
choose the environmentally friendly option than to choose the environmentally harmful
option. As argued by Henry Shue, some duties should be assigned to institutions instead of
individuals because that is likely to be more efficient. Institutions can make possible the
coordination and cooperation that are needed for those duties to be fulfilled. A second reason
is that it would be to demand too much of people to assign such duties to individuals because
individuals have rights as well as duties and should be allowed some time outside of their
role as duty-bearers. Thus, for reasons of efficiency as well as for reasons of fairness
institutions as opposed to individuals should be considered the main duty-bearers. However,
this does not mean that individuals are completely exempted. On the contrary, it is their duty
to make sure there are adequate institutions to implement the duties in question.24
22 Williams 2008 talks about a moral division of labor in a discussion of responsibility as a virtue.
According to Williams, the institutional fabric of liberal democratic societies creates a moral division of
labor by delimiting spheres of responsibility. For a discussion on fairness and efficiency as two aims of
responsibility ascriptions, see Nihle´n Fahlquist (2006).
23 C.f Jamieson (2007); Ladd (1991) concerning green and civic virtues respectively.
24 Shue (1988, pp. 696–698).
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Whereas, Shue argues that the role of institutions is to implement the duties, Michael
Green argues that the responsibility of institutions is even greater than the responsibility of
individuals. He argues that while it is reasonable to keep the restrictive version of
responsibility, i.e., the responsibility that always traces behavior to harm for individuals, a
more comprehensive kind of responsibility should be assigned to institutions because they
constitute a different kind of agent. Institutions have more power and can alter mass
behavior, they are better at collecting and processing information about direct and indirect
consequences of their actions and they can spread the cost through taxation. Essentially,
institutional agents have more capacity; hence a greater share of responsibility is justi-
fied.25 Similarly, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that whereas individuals do not have a
moral obligation not to waste gas, governments have a moral obligation to fight global
warming, primarily due to the scale of the problem.26
Thus, due to the urgency and scale of environmental problems, it appears a good case
can be made to include institutions into the discussion on how to distribute responsibility
for such problems. Having said that, the fundamental unit in society is the individual
citizen and institutions are created and upheld by individuals acting together. Hence, it
appears reasonable to expect individuals with capacity, resources, and knowledge to create
environmentally friendly institutions. In addition to voting, this also involves creating,
supporting, and joining organizations that work to improve the environment.27 This, in
turn, could entail different activities, for example working to directly improve the status of
the environment, working to improve consumers’ options and increase their information,
working to raise people’s awareness and working to change the more traditional organi-
zations (trade unions, culture and sports associations, and so forth). As argued by Sinnott-
Armstrong, instead of just withdrawing from society and adjusting one’s own lifestyle to
create as little environmental damage as possible, it is even more important to be proactive
and work to change government policies and laws.28
Conclusion
I have criticized the increasing tendency to hold individuals responsible for environmental
problems in a backward-looking sense. I have argued that individuals are not appropriate
targets of blame when acting in environmentally destructive ways unless they have rea-
sonable alternatives. Today, many individuals lack such options or do not have the
resources to do the environmentally friendly thing. Here are just a few general or structural
obstacles to individuals in modern societies that make unreasonably difficult to act in
environmentally friendly ways.
• The infrastructure in many societies encourages people to drive instead of using public
transport or bicycles. Individuals need to drive to the supermarket, to work and to
school. If they do not need to drive, it is often easier and/or less expensive to drive than
to take the train.
• It is assumed in many industries that people need to meet face to face, hence extensive
business traveling.
25 Green (2005).
26 Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, p. 304).
27 I would like to thank this journal’s Editor-in-Chief for commenting on this.
28 Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, p. 304).
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• The information about the origin and energy cost of producing certain consumer goods,
e.g., food, is often inadequate.
• Government information is sometimes unclear, or even conflicting. Food products that
are encouraged for health reasons are sometimes discouraged from an environmental
perspective.29
• Climate-smart food is often substantially more expensive than regular food.
These are just a few general structural problems and there are also individual differences
that should be taken into account. What options an individual has or the cost of acting in an
environmentally friendly way should be seen as interplay between the individual and her
surrounding socio-economic, political, and cultural environment.
Although it is questionable to hold individuals responsible in the backward-looking
sense, it is reasonable to hold individuals responsible in a forward-looking sense. Again,
the different contexts and the different extent to which individuals have the capacity and
resources to assume such responsibility should be taken into account. The most important
conclusion is that governments and corporations have a great forward-looking responsi-
bility to create opportunities for individuals to behave responsibly and act in
environmentally friendly ways. Although acknowledging individual responsibility is
beneficial, we should make sure that institutional responsibility is not overlooked or
ignored as a consequence.
There are good reasons to argue that responsibility ascriptions and distributions should
be both i) fair and ii) efficient. They should be fair for reasons of social cooperation and
humanity. Cooperation is easier to achieve in a society where the norm is to hold someone
responsible only when it is fair to do so and such a society is arguably more humane. Of
course there is no simple answer to the question when it is fair to hold someone respon-
sible. However, it is common both in social practice and philosophical discussions to apply
a number of conditions when ascribing responsibility. For instance, an agent should only be
held responsible if she is eligible for normative assessment, meaning she is a mentally well
grown-up, she contributed causally to the event, she knew what she was doing, she did it
voluntarily, and what she did was wrong according to some set of norms.30 Of course, there
is disagreement on the content of these conditions as well as how important each one of
them is. The point is that we commonly use some set of conditions when ascribing
responsibility and this can be seen as a way to make sure that responsibility is ascribed and
distributed fairly.
The efficiency aim is about the way in which ascriptions and distributions of respon-
sibility contribute to solving societal problems. Whether it be public health, poverty,
education, or the environment—when discussing to whom we should ascribe responsibility
and the question how responsibility should be distributed between different actors (indi-
viduals, governments, corporations, teachers, parents, and so forth) we do not merely care
about what is fair, but also who is best apt at solving the problem.
To use this notion, my conclusion can be stated as follows. It is not fair to ascribe
responsibility in the backward-looking sense, i.e., to blame individuals, for environmentally
29 A case in point could be the Swedish National Food Administration encouraging people to eat more fish,
stating that people can eat as much farmed salmon as they want to without the risk of getting too much
dioxin. The Swedish Consumer Agency, on the other hand, declares that farmed fish cannot be recom-
mended from an environmental perspective.http://www.slv.se/templates/SLV_Page.aspx?id=14765&
epslanguage=SV#fisk (In Swedish, accessed 10 Oct 2007) http://www.konsumentverket.se/mallar/
sv/fakta_recept.asp?lngCategoryId=1223&lngArticleId=2319 (In Swedish, accessed 10 Oct 2007).
30 van de Poel et al. (Submitted).
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destructive actions unless they have reasonable alternatives and resources to act in
environmentally friendly ways. However, it is fair to ascribe forward-looking responsibility
to individuals, based on their capacity to contribute to solutions to environmental problems.
Furthermore, a considerable share of forward-looking responsibility should be ascribed to
governments and corporations because they can make the group of capable, hence respon-
sible, individuals larger. The urge to ascribe forward-looking responsibility to institutional
agents is motivated by the efficiency aim of responsibility distributions. Simply put, if we
ascribe responsibility to governments and corporations we have a better chance of creating a
society in which the opportunities to act in an environmentally friendly way increase.
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